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Highlights 
 The paper analyses the performance of three means-tested benefits in Bulgaria. 
 We use individual and household level data and microsimulation techniques.  
 We find high benefit non take-up, inclusion of non-entitled or non-poor recipients. 
 The transfers have negligible effect on the poverty rates.  
 Our results are robust to potential benefit underreporting in the household data. 
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Abstract 
Using household survey data and microsimulation techniques, we analyse the performance of 
three means-tested benefits in Bulgaria. We find that the transfers reach a small proportion of 
households with incomes below a relative poverty line, they have high non take-up rates, and 
large proportions of the recipients are neither poor nor entitled to receive the benefits. 
Unsurprisingly, although an important income source for poor households, the benefits have a 
very small impact on reducing the poverty rates. We show that our results are robust to 
potential underreporting of benefit receipt in the household survey. Finally, we analyse the 
effect of five reform scenarios, one of which fiscally neutral, on poverty and find that there is 
a large scope for policy improvement. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, poverty has been increasing in Bulgaria, rising in relative terms from 14 
percent in 1999 to 21 percent in 2012 and in absolute terms from 1.2 million individuals in 
1999 to 1.5 million individuals in 2012, despite a fall in the total population. In 2012, relative 
poverty in Bulgaria was among the highest in the EU, with an average poverty rate across the 
28 member states of 17 percent. One of the reasons is the small impact that social transfers in 
Bulgaria have on poverty, estimated to be among the lowest in the EU. This poor 
performance of the social transfers may in turn partly reflect low levels of expenditures on 
social protection – in 2011 the total spending on social protection in Bulgaria was 16.9 
percent of GDP, compared to an EU average of 28.3 percent, while the spending on means-
tested benefits was only 0.7 percent of GDP in Bulgaria relative to 3 percent of GDP on 
average in the EU (Eurostat)
2
 – but may also be due to poor design or implementation. 
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the performance of means-tested benefits 
in Bulgaria using household survey data and microsimulation methods. We look at the largest 
three means-tested benefits in Bulgaria – the heating allowance (HA), guaranteed minimum 
income (GMI) and child allowance (CA) – and evaluate their performance in terms of 
targeting and poverty reduction. Several targeting issues are addressed. We measure the 
degree to which benefits are not taken-up by the entitled population (non take-up) and to 
which non-entitled are among the benefit recipients (leakage). For those benefits which are 
means-tested, and therefore ought to target individuals on low incomes by design, we 
estimate how many of the poor are not being awarded with a benefit (exclusion of the poor) 
and how many among the recipients are in fact not poor (inclusion of the non-poor).
3
 We 
show that our results on targeting are robust to underreporting of benefit receipt in the 
                                                 
2
 All figures from Eurostat database, “At-risk-of-poverty rate by poverty threshold, age and sex (indicator: 
ilc_li02)”; “At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers (pensions included in social transfers) by poverty 
threshold, age and sex (indicator: ilc_li09)”; “Expenditure - Tables by functions, aggregated benefits and 
grouped schemes - in % of the GDP (indicator: spr_exp_gdp)”. 
3
 The definition of being poor is defined with respect to the relative poverty line, which is 60% of the median 
equivalised household disposable income. 
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household survey data. Finally, we estimate the effect of the benefits on poverty.  
Addressing targeting issues and thus understanding why benefits are not claimed by the 
entitled (or why they are received by the non-entitled) is important because this affects 
programme implementation and limits the extent to which policy goals can be achieved. 
Furthermore, if the reasons for not receiving are involuntary, such as imperfect information, 
high transaction costs or stigma, the groups intended to be targeted are not being treated 
equally by the welfare state (see, for a discussion, Oorschot, 1991). Equity issues will also 
arise if unintended and non-poor beneficiaries are awarded with a benefit, while the entitled 
and poor are excluded.
4
 If such issues are present, policy makers cannot anticipate the true 
effect of policy interventions.   
The paper enriches the analysis on the performance of means-tested benefits in Europe by 
providing some of the first estimates of non take-up and leakage for an Eastern European 
country. Although there is a variety of means-tested benefits in Bulgaria to protect those at 
risk of poverty, to date there has been little empirical evidence on how successful these 
benefits are in reaching and protecting them (although see World Bank, 2009)
5
. In particular, 
the ability of the programmes to target specific population groups (those entitled to the 
benefits) has remained unknown. Although there is a large literature estimating non take-up 
of means-tested benefits and trying to understand the drivers of this behaviour (see, for 
example, Mangiavacchi & Verme, 2013; Bargain et al., 2012; Matsaganis et al., 2010), 
leakage rates have been rather neglected in the literature (for some exceptions see Benitez-
Silva et al., 2004, and Kleven et al., 2011).  
In this analysis, we make use of household survey data combined with a tax and benefit 
microsimulation model. The former, namely the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC), tell us which households are receiving benefits in 2007; the 
latter allows us to identify the households in the EU-SILC that are entitled to receive means-
tested benefits (as well as estimate the financial value of these entitlements). The tax-benefit 
                                                 
4
 Depending on the policy rules, the entitled and poor can be overlapping groups but not necessarily the same. 
The same is valid for the non-entitled and non-poor. 
5
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the only extensive empirical analysis on social assistance benefits in 
Bulgaria. The study provides an evaluation of the performance of social transfers in Bulgaria and it finds low 
levels of coverage among the poor with high levels of inclusion of non-poor recipients. However, the 
analysis does not provide any estimates on benefit non take-up and leakage, i.e. the number of entitled who 
do not claim the benefits or the number of non-entitled among the benefit recipients. 
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microsimulation model used here is the Bulgarian component of the EU-wide 
microsimulation model EUROMOD (for more information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland & 
Figari, 2013). In addition, after analysing the status quo, we simulate five reform scenarios to 
the existing benefits (one of which fiscally-neutral) as a way to explore the impact of policy 
changes on poverty and the scope for policy improvement.  
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that most of the spending and beneficiaries of 
the social assistance benefits, HA and GMI, come from the left tail of the income distribution. 
However, the programmes reach a very small proportion of the households with incomes 
below the relative poverty line. Recipients of the child benefit, CA, are distributed almost 
evenly across the deciles of the income distribution, due to its generous income-test. 
However, the benefit fails in providing income support to all poor households with families 
with children, leaving 30 percent of them unreached by the transfer. Second, we find that 
more than 40 percent of the intended beneficiaries of HA and GMI, and 30 percent of the 
intended beneficiaries of CA, do not take up benefits to which they are entitled.
6
 We also find 
that a large proportion of beneficiaries report incomes which exceed the income-test 
threshold, and so should have disqualified them from entitlement. These results raise serious 
concerns about the quality of programme implementation. Third, the three benefits have 
negligible effect on the poverty rate: less than a 1 pp reduction. Moreover, we show that 
poverty rates would remain broadly unchanged even under a scenario of 100 percent benefit 
take-up and no leakage to the non-entitled. These results put Bulgaria among the worst 
performers in the region in terms of targeting the vulnerable and reducing poverty (see 
Avram, 2013). Finally, we consider the effect of five reform scenarios on poverty. Even a 
fiscally neutral scenario proves to be more effective than the current system in reducing 
poverty, showing that there is scope for policy improvement.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the three means-tested 
benefits in Bulgaria. Section 3 describes the definitions of targeting, the methodology we 
adopt, the household survey data from EU-SILC and the tax-benefit microsimulation model 
EUROMOD. It also discusses the implications of benefit underreporting in the survey data on 
                                                 
6
 Reasons for non take-up of benefits come from both the demand and supply side. Due to stigma, high 
transaction costs (long waiting time, queues etc.), and the low level of the benefits, entitled individuals could 
consider the application process too complicated or too costly and decide not to apply for the social transfers 
(Moffitt, 1983). On the supply side, excessive bureaucracy or complicated programme design can mean that 
benefits are not provided to the intended population (see Currie, 2006). 
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the results and other data and microsimulation-related issues. Section 4 shows the results for 
targeting and poverty reduction. Section 5 presents five alternative policy scenarios and 
analyses their effect on poverty. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Means-tested benefits in Bulgaria 
This section describes the details of the three benefits under study. These are the heating 
allowance, guaranteed minimum income and child allowance. The three benefits amount to 
84 percent of the total budget for means-tested benefits in 2007 (see Boshnakov et al. (2012) 
and Eurostat).
7
 Although there is a range of other means-tested cash and in kind benefits, they 
are not part of the analysis because their role in terms of income support provision is smaller 
or information on them is missing from the household survey data.  
The heating allowance (HA) (целева помощ за отопление) is given to the household and is 
intended to cover various groups of the population: single-person households, elderly, 
orphans, lone parents, families with children, students and individuals with disabilities. The 
benefit is paid each month for a period of 5 months during the winter. The applicant needs to 
fulfil conditions related to various demographic and economic characteristics such as age, 
health status, employment status, and household size, as well as assets. Furthermore, 
entitlement requires household income to be below a certain threshold where the threshold 
varies by individual characteristics and household type. This threshold is calculated as a  
percentage of a guaranteed minimum income level (gmil), which is defined as a minimum 
level for survival and amounts to 55 BGN per month in 2007 (28 EUR). The percentage rate 
varies from 120 percent for an adult living with her spouse to 240 percent for an elderly 
person. The benefit is paid at a rate common to all households (but varying by the heating 
source used by the household – electricity, central heating, natural gas or coal). The average 
benefit amount in the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
used for the analysis is 17 BGN per month (9 EUR or 8 percent of the relative poverty line). 
The guaranteed minimum income benefit (GMI) (месечна парична помощ поради ниски 
доходи) is granted to households with low incomes. Entitlement is defined in a similar way 
as for HA. The allowance is granted to households, which fulfil certain requirements related 
                                                 
7
 For information on the total spending on means-tested benefits see Eurostat database, „Tables by functions, 
aggregated benefits and grouped schemes - in MIO of national currency (indicator: spr_exp_nac)‟.  
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to demographic and economic characteristics, household size, assets
8
 and whose household 
income is below a certain threshold. The threshold ranges from 30 percent of gmil for a child 
aged between 7 and 16 years, to 165 percent for an elderly person. If a household comprises 
of more than one individual, the sum of all thresholds for all individuals in the household 
represents the threshold for the whole household. The amount of the benefit equals the 
difference between the total household threshold and the gross household income; that is, the 
benefit is withdrawn with income. It is paid for 12 months. The household average monthly 
benefit amount in EU-SILC is 63 BGN (32 EUR or 30 percent of the poverty line).  
The monthly child allowance for bringing up a child until completion of secondary school 
(CA) (месечна помощ за отглеждане на дете до завършване на средното образование, 
но не по-късно от 20-годишна възраст) targets low income families with children. It is 
paid to families with child(ren) up to the age of 18 (or 20 if the child is enrolled in secondary 
school). The value of the income test in 2007 is 200 BGN per month (100 EUR) per family 
member. The benefit is provided to the family on a monthly basis. In 2007, its value is 18 
BGN for the first child, 20 BGN for the second child and 20 BGN (in total) for the third and 
all subsequent children. The average monthly benefit amount per family in the EU-SILC is 
24 BGN (12 EUR or 12 percent of the poverty line). 
The income sources used in the income-test of the three benefits are: employment income, 
self-employment income, income from rent, public pensions, contributory benefits (for 
unemployment, sickness, pregnancy and childbirth, and maternity), and education 
scholarships. The benefits HA and GMI also enter the income-test for CA and vice versa. The 
application for the benefits is based on self-reported income (and other information). 
Applicants have to attach an income declaration issued by a relevant person or institution 
(e.g. the employer) as evidence. However, no evidence needs to be attached if zero income is 
reported in the application.  
The objective of HA and GMI, as defined in the Law on Social Assistance (LSA) (2012), is to 
supplement or replace incomes and cover individuals‟ basic needs defined as sufficient 
                                                 
8
 According to the conditions for the asset-test for both HA and GMI, the benefit claimant should: live in a 
dwelling composed of maximum 1 room per household member; not possess assets that can represent a 
source of income, except for the belongings that serve the usual needs of the family; not have contracts for a 
transfer of property in return for support and care (e.g. caring for lone elderly owners); not have acquired 
property through purchase or donation during the last 5 years.   
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amount of food, clothing and housing to survive. CA has the goal of providing income 
support for families with children. We could not find documentation on the methodology 
used to determine the value of the gmil, the thresholds for the various population groups or 
benefit levels. There are also no indexation rules in place for gmil and the size of the benefits.  
3. Methodology and data 
This section starts with the different definitions of targeting: non take-up, leakage, exclusion 
of the poor and inclusion of the non-poor. After that, we explain our approach of combining 
household survey data with a tax-benefit microsimulation model, followed by a detailed 
description of the data and the model. We then focus on the issue of benefit underreporting in 
the survey data and describe the robustness checks we undertake. Finally, we validate the 
reported benefits in the household survey data and simulated benefit entitlements produced 
by the tax-benefit model using data from official administrative records. 
Definitions of targeting 
Our approach is to assess the extent of vertical and horizontal targeting efficiencies. They 
imply that only the poor, and all the poor, should be awarded with a means-tested benefit. We 
measure two targeting errors related to these concepts: the rate of inclusion of the non-poor, 
and exclusion of the poor. Additionally, two more types of targeting errors are calculated: 
benefit non take-up (two definitions are considered following Brewer (2003) and Bargain et 
al. (2012)) and leakage to non-entitled households.     
Starting with the last two definitions, estimating benefit non-take up and leakage rates is 
crucial in assessing the performance of transfer programmes because they affect programme 
implementation and policy goals achievement. Non take-up can be measured in two ways. 
First, it can be the fraction of people entitled to receive a benefit, but not provided with it. 
𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑢𝑝1 =
𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑,𝑛𝑜𝑡  𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑
, 
 
where 𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑,𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 is the number of entitled households (or households with entitled 
families as in the case of CA) who did not receive the benefit and 𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑 is the total number 
of intended beneficiaries (those in receipt and not in receipt).  
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The second type of non take-up rate: 
𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑢𝑝2 =
𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑,𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 + 𝑁𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑,𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
, 
expresses the total number of households eligible for the benefit, but not in receipt of it, as a 
percentage of the sum made up of those receiving the benefits (whether entitled or non-
entitled) and those entitled but not reporting receipt. This definition of non take-up 
acknowledges that some of the recipients may not be assessed as entitled due to error in 
identifying them or that some of the recipients may be truly non-entitled due to leakage. The 
denominator of the second non take-up rate is equal or larger than the denominator of the first 
non take-up rate and so estimates for this indicator are equal or lower, respectively, than for 
the first definition. In the literature, these two rates are combined to show in a way an upper 
(definition 1) and lower (definition 2) bounds of non take-up (see Brewer (2003) and Bargain 
et al. (2012)). 
The leakage rate is defined as the non-entitled households who receive a social transfer 
(𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡) as a proportion of all beneficiaries (𝑁𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡): 
𝑅𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
.  
To calculate the extent of exclusion of the poor, and inclusion of the non-poor among 
beneficiaries, we use a poverty line of 60% of the median equivalised household disposable 
income, and denote individuals in households with incomes lower than the poverty line as 
being poor. Regarding horizontal equity, the definition of the exclusion error refers to the 
proportion of poor not in receipt of a social transfer. This rate estimates the capacity of the 
programmes to correctly identify the poor. The exclusion error equals: 
𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 =
𝑁𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟,𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟
. 
𝑁𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟,𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 is the number of households with income below the relative poverty line 
who did not receive the benefit and 𝑁𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 is the total number of poor households below the 
relative poverty line (or poor households with families with children as in the case of CA). 
The inclusion error looks at how many of the programme recipients were not poor before 
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receiving the benefit. The rate is equal to the following fraction:   
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 =
𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟,𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
𝑁𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡
, 
where 𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟,𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 is the number of non-poor households who receive the benefit. 
To be able to estimate benefit non-take up and leakage, we require information at the 
individual or household level on 1) who actually receives the benefit and 2) who is legally 
entitled to receive it. Information on the former can be found in the data from the European 
Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) used for the analysis, where 
households report different sources of incomes. However, EU-SILC, similar to any other 
survey, does not ask households/individuals if they are entitled to a benefit. This information 
can be only acquired through a tax-benefit microsimulation model which calculates 
entitlements based on information on household circumstances available in the survey data 
and knowledge of the benefit legislation. We discuss our approach in more detail below. 
Data description  
The household survey data are from the European Union Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). EU-SILC is the largest and most detailed household income survey 
existing at the moment in Bulgaria. It is used by the National Statistical Institute for official 
statistics on social inclusion and living conditions. The data are nationally representative and 
contain individual and household level information on demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics and incomes from various sources such as (self-)employment, pensions and 
benefits. The data we use are collected in 2008 with income reference period 2007. EU-SILC 
used in this analysis is a combination of the User Data Base SILC, which contains aggregate 
information about benefits, and some national SILC variables, which provide data about the 
separate benefit components. For a detailed data description, see Appendix 1. 
EUROMOD 
The entitlements to means-tested benefits for each household in the EU-SILC are calculated 
by EUROMOD. The model consists of components for each EU member state. It operates 
based on nationally representative household survey data. By using information on household 
and individual characteristics and market incomes taken from the data and combining it with 
country-specific legislation rules, the model calculates (simulates) household and individual-
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level benefit entitlements, tax and social insurance liabilities as well as household disposable 
income (for a detailed model description, see Sutherland & Figari (2013)). EUROMOD has 
been widely used in the economics literature (for recent publications see e.g. Bargain et al., 
2014; Dolls et al., 2012). It has also been used to estimate non take-up rates in Greece and 
Spain (Matsaganis et al., 2010). To calculate benefit non take-up and leakage rates, we 
compare information on receipt of the three means-tested benefits observed in the survey data 
with simulated entitlements to the same three benefits as calculated by EUROMOD, all for a 
given household.  
The definition of household disposable income used throughout the analysis includes the sum 
of market income (income from employment, self-employment, property (rent), net private 
transfers (private transfers received minus maintenance payments), interest, other (income 
received by children under 16)), pension income (benefits for old-age, survivor and 
disability), other benefits (for unemployment, maternity, sickness, family, social assistance, 
housing, education), income from agricultural and own production, minus income tax, 
property tax and social insurance contributions. 
Accounting for benefit underreporting 
When using household survey data and microsimulation techniques, five issues could bias the 
results. Measurement error in the data and the simulations may drive the bias in different 
directions.  
First, EU-SILC does not collect enough information on assets to allow the simulation of all 
eligibility criteria for HA and GMI. In the absence of data, we assume the household meets 
that particular criterion. As a result, the following two biases may arise: First, if non-entitled 
recipients are misclassified as entitled recipients, the numerator in the calculation of leakage 
will go down while the denominator in the calculation of non take-up based on the first 
definition only will go up which would result in both leakage and non take-up being 
underestimated. Second, if non-entitled non-recipients are wrongly classified as entitled non-
recipients, the numerator in the formula for non take-up based on both definitions will 
increase (more relatively to the denominator) and non take-up will be overestimated.  
Second, a known problem of survey data on incomes is that it may fail to cover individuals at 
the very bottom of the income distribution (e.g. people not living in households). In this case 
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then our results may be biased in either direction, depending on the size of the excluded 
population and the number of (non-)entitled (non-)recipients among them.  
Third, a general sort of error can occur if there are errors in the calculations done by the 
microsimulation model (for example, a mismatch between the data reference period in the 
survey data and the time period when the income-test has been applied); these could cause 
biases in any direction.
9
  
Fourth, we typically think the prevailing measurement issue in survey data is income 
underreporting (see for a recent analysis Brewer et al. (2013) and Meyer et al. (2015)). 
Underreporting of those sources of income, that are used to assess entitlements to benefits, 
could result in the following biases (similar to the biases described under the first point): If 
non-entitled recipients underreport incomes, so they are misclassified as entitled recipients, 
then both non take-up based on the first definition and leakage will be underestimated (the 
denominator in the formula for non take-up will increase, while the numerator in the leakage 
rate will decrease). If non-entitled non-recipients underreport incomes, so they look like 
entitled non-recipients, then the numerator in the calculation of non take-up (both definitions) 
will increase more relatively to the denominator and so, non take-up will be overestimated. 
There will be no impact on these rates if households – entitled recipients or entitled non-
recipients – are not misclassified even though they underreport incomes. Appendix 1 gives 
more details on the EU-SILC data, and a comparison between EU-SILC and national 
accounts data. To sum up, we find limited evidence on the extent of income underreporting in 
EU-SILC and among the recipients of HA, GMI and CA. This does not allow us to measure 
the direction or size of a potential bias in the results.  
Finally, an important concern for the validity of the results is the issue of benefit 
underreporting (see Lynn et al. (2012) on the incidence of benefit underreporting and ways of 
reducing it in panel data). Benefit underreporting may refer either to a household reporting a 
lower amount of the received benefit or to a household declaring falsely that it has not 
received a benefit at all. When calculating non take-up and leakage only the second type of 
                                                 
9
 For GMI and HA, the income-test refers to incomes from previous month. There is no information in the data, 
on when benefit receipt started and the available data are only for 2007. For the income-test, we used 
therefore average monthly incomes for 2007, although there might have been fluctuations over the months, 
which are not considered, and the income-test might have referred to incomes from 2006, which are not 
observed. It is not clear, though, in which direction the results will be biased. 
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benefit underreporting may bias our results: If the benefit of interest has been underreported 
only by entitled households, then non take-up and leakage will be overestimated. However, if 
the benefit has been underreported only by the non-entitled (i.e. there genuinely is leakage 
but it is underreported in the survey), then results for leakage will be underestimated while 
non take-up based on the second definition will be overestimated.  
Due to lack of administrative data, none of these biases can be measured and so the 
magnitude of the error is, in general, not verifiable. However, we can address the issue of 
benefit underreporting, i.e. not reporting to have received a benefit, which we believe may be 
one of the largest concerns.  
We proceed by noting two discrepancies. First, the total number of reported benefit recipients 
in the EU-SILC data is lower than the total number of households that are simulated to be 
entitled (by EUROMOD). Second, the total number of reported benefit recipients in the EU-
SILC data is also lower than the total number of recipients according to administrative figures 
(see next subsection). Let us assume that this is entirely due to benefit underreporting in EU-
SILC. Thus, the magnitude of underreporting can be quantified according to either the first or 
second discrepancy.  
We consider the following five scenarios: a baseline scenario with no correction for 
underreporting, and scenarios for which we assume that benefits have been underreported in 
EU-SILC by non-recipients who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or iv) non-poor. We 
impute benefit receipts (by random selection) for each scenario separately, so that non-
recipients are transformed into recipients. As a result, there is an increase in the number of 
recipients in EU-SILC who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or iv) non-poor. The 
number of imputed benefit receipts depends on the two discrepancies: according to the first 
one, the number of benefit recipients in EU-SILC would equal the number of households 
with a simulated entitlement; according to the second one, the number of benefit recipients in 
EU-SILC would match the number of recipients from administrative statistics. Scenarios i) to 
iv) represent the extremes and we have selected these to calculate lower and upper bounds 
around the targeting error rates. Scenarios i) and ii) provide bounds around non take-up and 
leakage, while scenarios iii) and iv) provide bounds around the rates of exclusion of the poor 
and inclusion of the non-poor. 
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The imputations under scenario i) will provide a lower bound for benefit non take-up and 
leakage: as the number of entitled recipients goes up, the numerator in the formulae for non 
take-up (i.e. the number of entitled non-recipients) will go down and so, non take-up will fall. 
In terms of leakage, the denominator in the formula (i.e. all recipients) will increase and so, 
the rate will fall.  
Scenario ii) will provide us with an upper bound for leakage: the numerator in the leakage 
rate (i.e. the number of non-entitled recipients) will increase more relatively to the 
denominator (i.e. all recipients) and so, leakage will increase. Non take-up based on the first 
definition will not change because of non-accountability of non-entitled in the calculation. 
Non take-up based on the second definition will fall as the denominator (i.e. the number of 
recipients plus entitled non-recipients) will increase.  
Under scenario iii) a lower bound for the rates of exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the 
non-poor will be calculated: as the number of poor recipients among all poor increases, the 
rate of exclusion of the poor will go down. In addition, the denominator in the rate of 
inclusion of the non-poor (i.e. all recipients) will also increase and so, the rate will go down. 
Finally, under scenario iv) an upper bound for the rate of inclusion of the non-poor will be 
generated: the numerator in the rate (i.e. the number of non-poor recipients) will increase 
more relatively to the denominator (i.e. all recipients) and so, the rate of inclusion of the non-
poor will increase. The rate of exclusion of the poor will remain the same, because non-poor 
are not taken into account in the calculation. 
Data comparisons and related issues 
In this subsection, we validate the simulated benefit entitlements produced by the 
EUROMOD model and reported benefits in EU-SILC using data from official administrative 
records with a view to understand if there is benefit non take-up or leakage. Table 1 compares 
the number and total amount of simulated entitlements (calculated by EUROMOD) with the 
number of benefit recipients and total spending recorded in EU-SILC, and the corresponding 
totals of recipients and spending recorded in administrative data. We observe that the number 
of simulated social assistance entitlements is less than the number of recipients from 
administrative figures (the ratio is 0.69 for HA and 0.73 for GMI, see ratio (1/2) in panel A); 
this could be an indication that part of the benefits may be distributed to non-entitled 
recipients (i.e. there is benefit leakage). In contrast, the number of simulated CA entitlements 
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is higher than the number of CA recipients from administrative figures (the ratio is 1.11): this 
discrepancy points to the possibility of benefit non take-up.   
Comparing the number of benefit recipients from EU-SILC with those from the 
administrative figures (ratio (4/2)) in panel A suggests that all benefits might be 
underreported in EU-SILC. On the other hand, the number of recipients from EU-SILC is 
lower than the number of simulated entitlements, which could also indicate benefit non take-
up.  
Moving on to panel B of Table 1, ratio (1/2) shows the total amount of simulated entitlements 
from EUROMOD over the total spending from administrative figures. As the ratios for HA 
and GMI are lower than 1, this indicates that the spending of the two benefits has been 
undersimulated by EUROMOD; the ratio for CA is 1.07 meaning that the total spending for 
CA is slightly oversimulated. This is in line with the findings in the paragraphs above. In the 
case of the three benefits, ratio (1/2) is higher than ratio (4/2), implying that the average 
simulated entitlements are higher than the average amount of benefit receipt reported in the 
underlying micro data EU-SILC. 
„place Table 1 here‟ 
Table 2 compares the mean monthly values of the benefit entitlements, separately for those 
reporting positive amounts in EU-SILC and for those simulated to be entitled by 
EUROMOD. In the case of HA, which is paid at a rate common to all households, the 
average reported value of the benefit and simulated entitlements are close to identical.
10
 GMI 
and CA are not paid at a common rate to all households: the GMI amount depends on 
household incomes, while the CA amount depends on the number of children. Table 2 shows 
that the mean simulated unclaimed entitlement (for those simulated eligible but not reporting 
a positive amount) for both benefits is lower than the mean simulated claimed entitlement 
(for those simulated eligible and reporting a positive amount). This is in line with the idea 
that a higher entitlement to benefits helps offset the (actual or opportunity) costs of claiming 
benefits, e.g. the cost of collecting necessary application documents, long waiting times and 
stigma.   
„place Table 2 here‟ 
                                                 
10
 The small discrepancy can be explained as the average benefit duration assumed by EUROMOD is the 
maximum possible and it is slightly higher than the average benefit duration reported in the data.   
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4. Results 
This section presents the main results and assesses the performance of the benefits across 
several dimensions. It starts with looking at the benefit incidence across the income 
distribution. The analysis moves on to targeting issues, by providing estimates for benefit non 
take-up, leakage to non-entitled claimants, exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the non-
poor among the benefit recipients. The results are demonstrated to be robust to an adjustment 
for benefit underreporting in the data if the adjustment is based on the difference between the 
number of reported claimants in EU-SILC and the total number of simulated entitlements by 
EUROMOD. If the adjustment is based on the difference between the number of recipients in 
EU-SILC and administrative figures, the bounds of the estimates for social assistance 
increase and the results become less robust, while the opposite is true for the child benefit. 
The final part of the section compares the pre-transfer and post-transfer poverty figures, 
providing a discussion on the impact of the benefits on poverty in Bulgaria. 
Benefit incidence  
This subsection shows the incidence of the three benefits across the income distribution. 
Individuals are ranked based on their equivalised household disposable income before 
receiving each one of the transfers in turn.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of spending on HA, GMI and CA as reported in EU-SILC 
(the grey lines) alongside the total amount of simulated entitlements by EUROMOD (the 
black lines). The figure shows that based on EU-SILC, all three benefits target the poor well. 
GMI performs best with 77 percent of its spending going to the poorest two deciles. A similar 
picture emerges for HA with 69 percent of the budget going to the poorest two deciles of the 
income distribution. In terms of CA spending, 26 percent is transferred to the bottom two 
income deciles. This is in line with the design of the benefit – high income-test – which aims 
at reaching families from the higher tail of the income distribution.  
„place Figure 1 here‟ 
Figure 2 repeats the exercise but for benefit receipt: 74 percent of GMI and 69 percent of HA 
recipients come from the bottom two income deciles, but CA reaches the poor to a lesser 
extent as only 25 percent of CA recipients come from the poorest two deciles. Contrasting 
this to Figure 1, the results suggest that the mean value of GMI is slightly higher for the 
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lower 2 deciles than for the rest of the distribution. The value of HA is equal across 
recipients, given that it is a uniform benefit paid at the household level. The mean value of 
CA is larger for the poorer deciles because of larger number of children in poorer households. 
„place Figure 2 here‟ 
Turning to the results of the simulated benefit entitlements, we see that the distribution of the 
simulated GMI and HA is even more concentrated in the first two income deciles, making 
them more progressive than the benefits reported in EU-SILC. The distribution of the 
simulated CA is also more concentrated at the bottom part of the distribution making it 
appear more progressive than actual receipt as reported in EU-SILC. Assuming that there are 
no programme implementation errors, one would expect that the distribution of the reported 
benefits and simulated entitlements (both spending and recipients) to be identical. The next 
subsection addresses this puzzle. 
Targeting  
The previous indicators offer only limited information about the performance of the benefits 
in terms of targeting, the extent to which the actual distribution of a benefit corresponds to 
the desired distribution. Given that the benefits are aimed at satisfying the basic living needs 
of the individuals, it is important to see what proportion is given to the entitled and/or poor 
and what proportion is given to the non-entitled and/or non-poor. 
The estimates for the targeting errors i.e. non take-up, leakage, exclusion of the poor and 
inclusion of the non-poor, together with their standard errors, are shown in Table 3. Based on 
the first definition of non take-up (the proportion of entitled non-recipient over all entitled 
households), the non take-up rate amounts to large 66 percent for HA and 73 percent for 
GMI, and 39 percent for CA. The substantial non take-up rates of HA and GMI are in line 
with the qualitative analysis in Bogdanov & Zahariev (2009) which suggests that the high 
complexity of the programmes causes confusion for the social workers, who are forced to 
deal with an enormous amount of paper work. This could result in incorrectly turning down 
applications by otherwise entitled households. Similarly, claimants of social assistance report 
that the application process is very long and cumbersome and that the benefit amount is too 
low to provide sufficient income support. 
When we compare the estimates for the first definition with the ones for the second definition 
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of non take-up (the proportion of entitled non-recipient over all recipient and entitled non-
recipient households), some key differences between the two are revealed. In line with the 
non take-up rates under definition 1, the rates under definition 2 are the highest for HA and 
GMI (41 percent and 47 percent, respectively). However, in contrast to CA, there is 
substantial difference under the two definitions for HA and GMI. This suggests a potentially 
large leakage to the non-eligible population for these two benefits.   
In comparison to non take-up of means-tested benefits in other countries, the estimated rates 
in Bulgaria are relatively high. Non take-up for social assistance is of similar size to the rates 
(definition 1) in Germany (63 percent for Social Assistance in 1993 (Riphahn, 2001)) and 
Greece (63 percent for pensioner social solidarity benefit and 38 percent for pension to 
uninsured elderly in 2004 (Matsaganis et al., 2010)). In Spain, Australia and Finland, on the 
other hand, benefit non take-up is smaller compared to the estimates for HA and GMI: based 
on definition 1, 22 percent for supplements to reach the minimum and 44 percent for non-
contributory old-age pensions in 2004 in Spain (Matsaganis et al., 2010); 15 percent for 
Income Support and 29 percent for Parenting Payment in 2002 in Australia using definition 1 
(Mood, 2006); and between 43 percent (definition 2) and 51 percent (definition 1) for social 
assistance in 2003 in Finland (Bargain et al., 2012). In the UK, the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) has been publishing benefit take-up estimates ranges until 2009/10. We have 
translated these into non take-up rates based on definition 2 and the extent of the issue varies 
depending on the benefit: 11-23 percent for Income Support and Employment and Support 
Allowance, 20-27 percent for Guarantee Credit, and 16-22 percent for Housing Benefit 
(DWP, 2012). The evidence about the USA is also somewhat mixed, depending on the 
benefits (see Currie (2006) for an overview). 
Moving to leakage, the proportion of non-entitled recipient over all recipient households, the 
rate equals 64 percent for HA and 68 percent for GMI. Although recipients are mostly in the 
first two income deciles, the estimate of leakage is high because the programmes are targeted 
at the first income decile only. Thus, whilst we see high non take-up rates for HA and GMI 
amongst the targeted population, a substantial number of households who do not fulfil the 
income-test are in receipt of social assistance. In contrast, the estimated leakage rate for CA is 
lower at 19 percent reflecting the fact that a larger share of the population is eligible for the 
benefit.  
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We consider three possible channels through which the high leakage of HA and GMI could 
occur. First, the confusion among social workers due to the complex benefit rules (see 
Bogdanov & Zahariev, 2009) could not only result in falsely rejecting applications by entitled 
households but also accepting applications by ineligible households. Second, corruption 
through bribes could be another channel through which benefits are transferred to non-
entitled households. Although there are no estimates on the size of corruption in Bulgaria, a 
few studies suggest very high public perception levels.
11
 The third channel could be related to 
the informal economy in Bulgaria in terms of underdeclaring income to authorities in order to 
avoid the payments of taxes or to receive benefit entitlements. Although there is no 
conclusive evidence on the size of informal economy in the country, again there is evidence 
on high public perception levels.
12
    
Worryingly, the results also show that very large numbers of the poor are excluded from the 
social assistance benefits: 77 percent for HA and 94 percent for GMI or in other words, only 
23 percent and 6 percent of the poor receive HA and GMI, respectively. In comparison, the 
results for 2007 of the World Bank study (2009) show similarly that the exclusion error of 
HA and GMI is equal to 87.9% and 88.6%, respectively.
13
 Although HA and GMI are mainly 
provided to the poor, their coverage is very low. vram (2013) estimates the percentage of 
poor receiving social assistance for 8 Central and Eastern European countries using the cross-
sectional component of EU-SILC for 2008. She finds very low coverage of the poor in the 
three Baltic countries, Estonia (8 percent), Latvia (16 percent) and Lithuania (20 percent). In 
                                                 
11
 For example, for a study on public perceptions of corruption levels see Eurobarometer report (2008): “The 
attitudes of Europeans towards corruption”, Special Eurobarometer 291, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_291_en.pdf. The study shows that in 2007 92% of the 
respondents agree with the statement that corruption is a major problem in Bulgaria. This puts the country on 
place 5 (out of 27) with EU27 average score of 75%. Between 82% and 85% of the respondents agree with 
the statement that there is corruption at local, regional or national institutions (with EU27 average score of 
73% to 77%). Bulgaria also scores about two times the EU27 average on the question if “giving and taking 
of bribes, and the abuse of positions of power for personal gains are widespread among”: the people working 
in the judicial, police or custom services, public health or education sectors. For other studies which show 
high levels of perceived corruption in Bulgaria, see http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0/. 
12
 For a study on employers and employees perceptions on the size of informal economy in Bulgaria see 
Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association (2012): “The first monitoring report on the informal economy and 
progress achieved in its prevention”, available in Bulgarian at: 
http://www.ikonomikanasvetlo.bg/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=cc8fb441-d183-42a5-b4b9-
14241cf5cd76&groupId=55360. There is also a study by Buehn & Schneider (2012) which estimates the size 
of shadow economy in Bulgaria in 2007 at high 32.7%. 
13
 The discrepancy in our and the World Bank (2009) results are likely to be due to differences in the survey data 
used in the analysis, in the definition of household disposable income and as a result, in the value of the 
relative poverty line. 
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the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the coverage rate varies between 26 
percent and 37 percent, while in Hungary it is found to be 46 percent. The findings suggest 
that social assistance benefits in Bulgaria, despite having the aim of covering basic needs and 
providing income support to the poor, have a low coverage of the poor similar (or worse) to 
the ones in the Baltic countries. 
The exclusion of poor households (with families with children) is 30 percent for CA, showing 
that it has a better coverage. We see that the smallest coverage of the poor occurs among the 
benefits with the highest leakage. This is an important finding, as it suggests that the 
coverage of the poor could be improved, by better targeting the benefits on poor households 
only (at no additional cost).  
The results for the inclusion of the non-poor are 34 percent for HA and 27 percent for GMI. 
In regard to this indicator, Bulgarian benefits are characterized with lower error in 
comparison to their counterparts in the other countries; the inclusion errors estimated by 
Avram (2013) are 30 percent for social assistance benefits in Lithuania, around 38 percent in 
the Czech Republic, 37 percent in Slovakia, 44 percent in Poland, 49 percent in Estonia, 54 
percent in Latvia, and more than 60 percent in Slovenia and Hungary. This might well be due 
to the higher income-test and larger population coverage of the schemes in the other Central 
and Eastern European countries (Avram, 2013). The inclusion of the non-poor is significantly 
higher for CA: the rate is estimated at 78 percent. This supports the above evidence showing 
substantial room for poverty reduction, by better targeting the available funds to the poor.  
The results are remarkable because the programmes are characterised by both high non take-
up and leakage, and both inclusion and exclusion errors. Elderly, people of working age, 
children, lone parents, parents of small children, and people with disabilities are targeted 
according to the programmes‟ design, and, yet, the coverage of the entitled and poor remains 
low, while leakage and inclusion of the non-poor is high.  
„place Table 3 here‟ 
Robustness checks 
In Section 3, Table 1 showed that for the three benefits, the number of observed receipts in 
the EU-SILC data is lower than both the total number of simulated entitlements by 
EUROMOD and the number of recipients from administrative figures. We assume that these 
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differences are entirely due to benefit underreporting, i.e. not reporting to have received a 
benefit (as opposed to reporting lower benefit amounts), in EU-SILC. In this way, we test the 
sensitivity of our results on the targeting error rates: non take-up, leakage, exclusion of the 
poor and inclusion of the non- poor.
14
  
As described in detail in Section 3, we look at the following five scenarios: the baseline 
scenario with no correction for underreporting, and scenarios where the benefits have been 
underreported in EU-SILC by non-recipients who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or 
iv) non-poor. We impute benefit receipts for each scenario separately, so that non-recipients 
are transformed into recipients. As a result, there is an increase in the number of recipients in 
EU-SILC who are i) entitled, ii) non-entitled, iii) poor, or iv) non-poor. Scenarios i) and ii) 
provide bounds around non take-up and leakage, while scenarios iii) and iv) provide bounds 
around the rates of exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the non-poor. The number of 
imputations is such that the total number of benefit receipts (both reported and imputed) in 
EU-SILC matches in the first case, the total number of simulated entitlements by 
EUROMOD and in the second case, the total number of benefit receipts according to 
administrative figures. Table 4 and Table 5 report how the targeting error rates change 
according to the first and second case, respectively. 
     „place Table 4 here‟ 
„place Table 5 here‟ 
The range of the bounds for HA and GMI in Table 4 is much smaller than in Table 5: this is 
because the discrepancy between the number of benefit receipts reported in EU-SILC and 
entitlements calculated by EUROMOD is smaller than the discrepancy between the number 
of receipts in EU-SILC and according to administrative records. The opposite is true for CA. 
Table 4 shows that after accounting for benefit underreporting the results remain robust with 
one exception – in the case of CA the lower bound for the exclusion of the poor equals 0.  
                                                 
14
 In addition, Appendix 2 reports the results from another sensitivity check based on simulations of 
measurement error in the income data. The results provide some limited evidence that suggests that the 
estimates on non take-up and leakage in this analysis cannot be explained by measurement error in the data. 
We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to implement these simulations. 
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In Table 5, the rate of non take-up 1 for HA and GMI is within a much larger range than as 
shown in Table 4. In Table 4, the range is between 60-66 percent for HA and 56-73 percent 
for GMI. In Table 5, the bounds increase to 16-66 percent for HA and 20-73 percent for GMI. 
There is also a substantial discrepancy between the lower and upper bounds for the rate of 
inclusion of the non-poor for both benefits. In Table 4, the estimates range between 32-38 
percent for HA and 23-39 percent for GMI. These increase to 22-57 percent for HA and 17-56 
percent for GMI in Table 5. The variation in the rates is also large for the leakage of HA and 
GMI in Table 5, 42-77 percent for HA and 41-80 percent for GMI; in contrast, in Table 4 it is 
only 60-66 percent for HA and 56-73 percent for GMI. However, the exclusion of the poor 
rate shows relatively close bounds for HA and GMI according to both tables.  
The estimated bounds for CA are much narrower in Table 5 than in Table 4. Furthermore, the 
lower limit for the exclusion of the poor while being 0 percent in Table 4 is 18 percent in 
Table 5.  
It should be stressed that the two tables show ranges based on the extreme assumption that 
benefit underreporting is the (only) reason why the number of benefit receipts in EU-SILC is 
lower than the number of entitlements calculated by EUROMOD and the number of benefit 
receipts from administrative data. Despite larger variations in some of the estimates for HA 
and GMI in Table 5 and CA in Table 4, we can see that the issues of targeting errors are 
persistent and suggest flaws in the benefit design and implementation.  
Impact on poverty  
Means-tested benefits are an important income source for the poor households, who receive 
them. In EU-SILC, for recipients in the poorest 10 percent of the population, GMI provides 
on average 67 percent of household disposable income, HA provides 46 percent, and CA 33 
percent (all conditional on receipt). Across those in receipt of at least one benefit, the benefit 
share of household income is, on average, 51 percent for the bottom income decile group. 
These proportions fall quickly as income rises, although benefits remain a significant income 
source up to the third decile (or the fourth decile in the case of CA) for those receiving them.  
Although an important income source for some of those in poverty, the benefits have a very 
small impact on reducing the poverty rates. Table 6 shows the estimated poverty figures 
based on the pre-transfer (column 2) and post-transfer (including reported benefits, column 3; 
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or including simulated entitlements, column 5) equivalised household income. The effect of 
the transfers is measured by the Foster – Greer – Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) poverty indicators: 
poverty headcount, gap and severity. The headcount ratio is the share of people with 
equivalised income below the poverty line. The poverty gap is the per capita amount of 
money, as a percentage of the poverty line, needed to be transferred to the poor to be lifted 
above the poverty threshold. The poverty severity shows the poverty variation by taking the 
square of the poverty gap relative to the poverty line. 
First, comparing pre-transfer and post-transfer estimates (columns 2 and 3 in Table 6): The 
poverty rate in 2007 based on the pre-transfer equivalised income is 18.1 percent, and the 
estimated reduction is only 0.1 percentage points (pp) (or 0.6 percent). The pre-transfer 
poverty gap is 6.3 percent (1.2 billion BGN). However, the total budget of the three means-
tested benefits represents only 28 percent of the gap (Boshnakov et al., 2012), while the 
spending on all means-tested benefits provide 34 percent of the gap (Eurostat); thus, even 
assuming that all poor would be reached by the transfers, these programmes would reduce the 
gap by around one third. Due to large targeting errors found in the previous subsection, the 
estimated reduction in the poverty gap after the provision of the transfers is only 0.6pp (or 
about 9 percent).  
We can compare these results with evidence for other European countries. Sainsbury & 
Morissens (2002) discuss the impact of means-tested benefits on poverty reduction across 
several European countries at the beginning and in the mid-90s. In the later period, the largest 
absolute poverty reduction effect is observed in the Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, UK 
and Poland with absolute poverty reduction equal to 4.2pp, 5.5pp, 5.1pp, 8.5pp and 4pp, 
respectively. In Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, France, Belgium and Italy, the effect is 
much smaller (2.7pp, 2.6pp, 1.8pp, 1.7pp, 0.8pp and 0.2pp, respectively), however, still larger 
than in Bulgaria. Avram (2013) shows that the poverty reducing effect of social assistance in 
2007 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia is also larger than in 
Bulgaria. These results can be explained by the much larger coverage of the programmes 
among the poor population and the larger spending as a share of the poverty gap. 
Furthermore, in the three Baltic countries, where both coverage and spending are smaller, the 
poverty reduction effect is still slightly larger than the one we observe in Bulgaria. 
If we compare the pre-transfer with post-transfer poverty figures, based on the simulated 
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benefits (columns 2 and 5 in Table 6), the simulated benefits reduce the headcount by 0.1pp 
(0.7 percent), and the gap and severity both by 1.4pp (22 percent and 43 percent, 
respectively). Importantly, the simulated results demonstrate that with error-free programme 
implementation the benefit payments would reduce the poverty gap and severity around 3 
times as much as the observed benefits do. These findings suggest that there is scope for 
policy improvement. And yet, poverty rates do not change dramatically, showing that the 
generosity of the benefits is too low for them to contribute to a large poverty reduction. 
„place here Table 6‟ 
5. Reform scenarios 
The findings on targeting errors and poverty reduction raise concerns about the effectiveness 
of the benefit programmes, and suggest the need to explore policy alternatives which could 
result in better targeting and higher poverty reduction. In this section we explore the poverty 
reducing effect of five different reform scenarios by using EUROMOD to calculate benefit 
entitlements under hypothetical policy rules. We assume full take-up and no leakage 
throughout. 
The first reform, called the income-test reform, alters the income-test only, while leaving the 
rest of the policy rules the same, with the aim to improve targeting of the poor. The reformed 
income-test is based on equivalised household disposable income, instead of per capita gross 
family (CA) or household (HA and GMI) income, as embedded in the current legislation.  
The remaining four reform scenarios illustrate the abolition of the three means-tested benefits 
and the introduction of only one benefit which will be equal either to a flat rate, or to the 
shortfall between the poverty threshold and the equivalised household disposable income. 
The arguments in favour of such reforms are that administering only one programme instead 
of three implies fewer costs to government agencies; simplifying and decreasing the number 
of eligibility criteria could lead to an increase in the take-up rate; better targeting of benefit 
resources towards the poor could increase the poverty reduction effect of the transfers.  
A budget-neutral scenario would involve a flat rate of 12.7 BGN per month being given to 
individuals with equivalised household disposable income below the 60 percent of the 
median poverty line. The other three scenarios differ from each other in the definition of the 
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poverty line: it is in turn 40 percent (40pl), 50 percent (50pl) or 60 percent (60pl) of the 
median equivalised household disposable income. 
In terms of total cost, the 40pl and income-test reforms will be cheaper than the existing 
systems, with a budget of 49 percent and 84 percent, respectively, of the budget for existing 
benefits. However, the number of benefit entitlements will be also significantly smaller, only 
30 percent and 43 percent, respectively, of the number of the 2007 benefit recipients. The 
budget-neutral, flat-rate benefit will have nearly the same number of benefit entitlements, 89 
percent. The other two scenarios, 50pl and 60pl suggest higher spending, equal to 1.03 and 
1.96 times the 2007 budget. Both scenarios will provide fewer entitlements, 57 percent and 
89 percent, respectively.  
Table 7 shows that, under the cheapest scenario, the 40pl reform, the reduction in the poverty 
gap and severity (0.9pp (equal to 14 percent) and 1.1pp (equal to 32 percent), respectively) 
would be greater than by the observed in the EU-SILC 2007 benefits (but less than by the 
simulated entitlements). The next cheapest option, the income-test reform, would have a 
larger reduction effect on the rates (larger than by the observed benefits as well as simulated 
entitlements). After the changes, the benefits would reach more households below the poverty 
threshold and provide them with higher benefit amounts. As a result, the headcount would be 
reduced by 0.4pp (2 percent), and the poverty gap and severity both by 1.6pp (26 percent and 
48 percent, respectively). These results highlight once again that the level of the benefits is 
too low and that there is potentially room for improvement.  
The budget-neutral, flat rate reform would have much larger headcount reducing effect of 
2.9pp (16 percent). The effect on both poverty gap and severity would be around 2-3 times 
higher than the effect of the  2007 observed benefits (although the effect on poverty severity 
will be lower compared to the effect of the simulated entitlements). Thus, at the same cost, 
policy effectiveness in terms of poverty reduction can be significantly increased.   
The 50pl reform would have a larger effect on the gap and severity (1.8pp (equal to 28 
percent) and 1.7pp (equal to 50 percent) reduction, respectively) but no effect on the 
headcount (the same as the 40pl reform). Finally, the 60pl reform would have the largest 
poverty reducing effect leading to the headcount, gap and severity falling by 3.4pp (19 
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percent), 3.1pp (50 percent) and 2.2pp (66 percent), respectively.
15
  
„place Table 7 here‟ 
The results in this section are purely illustrative. By exploring five reform scenarios we show 
that there is a large scope for policy improvement which, if further explored, could contribute 
to better targeting of the benefits to those in need, more adequate income support, and a 
significant reduction in poverty.  
6. Conclusion 
In recent years, poverty has been increasing in Bulgaria, rising from 14 percent in 1999 to 21 
percent in 2012. One of the explanations for this is the small impact that social transfers have 
on poverty, which could in turn partly reflect low levels of expenditures on social protection 
but may also be due to poor policy design or implementation. 
We provide a comprehensive assessment of the performance of the three largest means-tested 
benefits in Bulgaria combining household survey data with estimates of entitlements to 
benefits produced by the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD. We measure their 
performance in terms of targeting by estimating rates of benefit non take-up, leakage, 
exclusion of the poor, inclusion of the non-poor and the extent to which they reduce poverty. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature by providing some of the first measures of non 
take-up and leakage for an Eastern European country and of the benefits under study.  
The analysis finds very high rates of non take-up, leakage of the benefits to non-entitled 
households, exclusion of a large part of the poor, and inclusion of non-poor households and 
families mainly positioned in higher income deciles. Depending on the definition of benefit 
non take-up, we find that more than 40 percent of the households entitled for HA and GMI do 
not claim the benefits. Although GMI is a benefit intended to have a widespread coverage of 
the population, due to the very low income-test and, possibly, due to stigma, it has the 
smallest number of entitled and, together with HA, the highest rate of non take-up. In 
contrast, the child benefit CA, the entitlement to which is mainly defined based on the age of 
the children and a higher income-test, has a higher take-up, suggesting lower associated 
                                                 
15
 It should be noted that poverty rates are not reduced by 100% because the definitions of the income-test and 
the equivalised income used for estimating the poverty indicators differ. 
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stigma with claiming the benefit or lower information costs.  
Furthermore, a large proportion of the beneficiaries have incomes exceeding the income-test 
which should disqualify them from entitlement. This high rate of leakage could be explained 
by a failure of the social workers to administer the programmes correctly, by corruptions of 
civil servants through bribes or by under-declaring of claimants‟ incomes to the tax 
authorities. In either case, the very low performance of the benefits raises serious concerns 
about the quality of the programme implementation. We consider possible biases in the 
results that would arise if benefit receipt were underreported in EU-SILC, and calculate upper 
and lower bounds around the rates: the findings of the paper remain robust to these checks. 
In addition, despite the objectives of the programmes to cover basic needs and provide 
income support to the vulnerable, the level of the benefits and the coverage of the poor 
population are too low to have a significant poverty-reducing effect.   
Taking a longer-term perspective, since 2007, not much has been done in terms of reforming 
the Bulgarian means-tested benefit system. The main changes have been to income-
thresholds and benefit levels although we should note that statutory indexation rules are 
missing and the increases have lagged growth in prices and/or earnings (see Boshnakov et al., 
2012 and Boshnakov et al., 2014).  Given that the three benefits form the bulk of the social 
security budget spent on the poor, and given the increase in poverty in Bulgaria over the last 
decade, the results show that there is a need for policy improvement. We consider five 
potential reform scenarios and show that, even without increasing spending, the government 
could achieve the provision of more adequate income support and a significant reduction in 
poverty. 
 
Appendix 1 
Appendix 1 describes in detail the characteristics of the underlying household survey data 
from the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The 
response rate of the EU-SILC survey is 66.6%. Household non-response is mainly due to the 
following three reasons. First, 7.3% of the households did not respond because e.g. it was not 
possible to contact them at their address. Second, 26% of the households that were contacted 
did not complete the interview due to refusal to cooperate, absence of household members or 
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entire household, objective inability to respond, etc. Furthermore, due to person‟s non-
response and inability to impute the missing data, 5 households were dropped from the 
sample. Children born after the income reference period were also excluded. The final sample 
size consists of 4,339 households represented by 12,148 individuals.  
The National Statistical Institute (NSI) in Bulgaria, responsible for the collection of the data, 
has carried out various data cleaning and imputation procedures in case of income 
misreporting and unit non-response. For example, all gross income values have been checked 
against their net values. Lower and upper bounds based upon the national legislation have 
been also used as a check on most of the recorded social benefits and pensions. 
Administrative data from the National Social Security Institute, other administrative sources 
and data from previous waves of the longitudinal EU-SILC have been used for a comparison 
against extreme income values. 
An example of the checks carried out by the NSI is in regard to the contributory family-
related benefits. If an individual receives such benefits she is generally not eligible for non-
contributory social assistance benefits. NSI checks for consistency and makes data 
adjustments accordingly. Other adjustments are carried out if reported benefit amounts 
exceed the maximum possible payments, e.g. in the case of benefits for unemployment, old-
age, survivor, sickness and disability benefits. The data have also been corrected for possible 
double-reporting of income components.  
In regard to the two social assistance benefits, HA (Q30.1) and GMI (Q30.3), the question 
asked in the household EU-SILC questionnaire is: “Q.30 Have you or another member of the 
household received some of the following social benefits during 2007 for: Q30.1 assistance 
payments for heating; Q30.2 monthly assistance payments for rent; Q30.3 monthly monetary 
benefit for low income, Q30.4 lump-sum social aid for satisfying accidentally occurred 
health, educational, communal, household and other needs.” The respondent has to give 
answers for each of the benefits. If in receipt of the benefit, the respondent has to provide 
information on the duration of receipt and benefit amount.  
For the CA (Q32.3), the question in the survey is: “Q32 Have you or another member of the 
household received some of the following monthly family/children benefits during 2007 for: 
Q32.1 monthly benefits for bringing up a child younger than 1; Q32.2 monthly benefit for 
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bringing up child with permanent disabilities; Q32.3 monthly child benefits till 18 years of 
age; Q32.4 monthly child benefits till 20 years of age with permanent disability”. Here as 
well, the respondent has to give answer on the duration and amount of each of the benefits. 
The three benefits in the analysis are among the largest and most popular means-tested 
benefits in Bulgaria and their names are distinctive from each other suggesting they target 
different types of needs (provision of minimum income level, cash support for heating and 
support for children). Therefore, we do not have any reason to believe that respondents might 
not be aware of the name of the benefit if they receive it or that they have misreported it 
under a different benefit. 
In terms of validating the income variables reported in EU-SILC, we did extensive checks as 
part of validating the entitlements simulations done by EUROMOD. We compared 
information on market incomes, benefits, pensions and taxes and social insurance 
contributions (number of recipients/contributors and aggregate amounts) with data from 
national accounts, Household Budget Survey estimates, and administrative data from the 
National Social Security Institute and  Agency for Social Assistance. Where there were 
deviations between EU-SILC reported data, EUROMOD simulation results and data from 
external sources, these were carefully studied and explained by Boshnakov et al. (2012).  
For employment income, Boshnakov et al. (2012) report that EU-SILC, relative to national 
accounts data, overestimates both the number of individuals with employment income (by 
32.5 percentage points) and the total employment income (by 13.9 percentage points) which 
they explain could be due to informal employment and wages not accounted for in the 
national accounts. The average employment income in the survey is, however, 14.1 
percentage points lower than the national accounts average which could be explained by the 
extra employees in EU-SILC reporting low amounts of income on average (this could reflect 
informal earnings or underreporting of amounts in EU-SILC; there is no evidence of the 
relative size of either issue).   
For self-employment income, there are discrepancies between the definition of self-employed 
in EU-SILC and the one in the national accounts data which makes the comparison between 
the two sources problematic. Nevertheless, a comparison between the two sources shows the 
following: The number of self-employed in EU-SILC is exactly half the number reported in 
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national accounts (see Boshnakov et al., 2012). The national accounts data for the total 
amount of self-employment income is captured in the category “Net operating surplus and net 
mixed income” for the households. The total amount of self-employment income reported by 
respondents in EU-SILC is only 32.5% of the figure on “Net operating surplus and net mixed 
income” from the national accounts data (see here: http://nsi.bg/en/content/5547/annual-data). 
For rent, the national accounts figure which captures officially declared rents shows a very 
small amount compared to the one reported in EU-SILC.  
Public pensions and other benefits that enter the income-test for the three benefits studied in 
the paper seem to be well captured by EU-SILC. For more detailed information on EU-SILC 
data and EUROMOD simulations, see Boshnakov et al. (2012). 
To sum up, we find limited evidence on the extent of income underreporting in EU-SILC and 
among the recipients of HA, GMI and CA. This does not allow us to measure the direction or 
size of a potential bias in the results. 
Appendix 2 
To explore the possibility that our results on non take-up and leakage can be explained by 
measurement error in the income data, we performed a simulation. As Hernandez & Pudney 
(2007) argue, estimating jointly the extent of measurement error and non take-up based 
purely on data on incomes that contains measurement error is very challenging. Nevertheless, 
we present the results for illustrative purposes. 
First, we simulated income data which is log-normally distributed and identical in their 
statistical moments (mean and variance by income centiles) to the income data observed in 
EU-SILC and based on which benefit entitlements are assessed. As this exercise is for 
illustrative purposes we assumed that the simulated income data represent true incomes as 
opposed to the EU-SILC data which contain measurement error. Second, as the targeting 
measures are assessed at the household level, the number of observations in the simulated 
data equals the number of households in EU-SILC. Third, we simulated entitlement to the 
three benefits HA, GMI and CA assuming full take-up and no leakage. We added to the (log 
of the) simulated income data a random term with a mean of 0 which is normally distributed. 
In summary, the simulations show that such type of measurement error does not seem to 
generate a pattern of income misreporting that would explain the results in the paper. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
31 
 
Specifically, we assumed different values for the standard deviation of the random term 
which showed the following results, also reported in Table A2:  
A random term with standard deviation of 0.35 would re-produce (almost) the same non take-
up rate based on the second definition for HA and  leakage rate for CA observed in the paper. 
The generated non take-up rate based on the first definition for HA, non take-up rates (both 
definitions) for GMI and CA as well as leakage rates for HA and GMI would be lower than 
the ones estimated in the paper. Notably, the standard deviation of the income will be 
increased by a substantial 22 percent. 
Increasing the standard deviation of the random term to 0.4 would result in an even larger 29 
percent increase in the standard deviation of the income data. The simulations show that the 
non take-up rate based on the second definition for HA and the leakage rate for CA will be 
slightly overestimated. The non take-up rate based on the second definition for GMI will be 
re-produced at a level as estimated in the paper. However, the non take-up rates based on the 
first definition for HA and GMI and both definitions for CA will continue to be 
underestimated. The leakage rates for HA and GMI will be still nowhere near the rates 
estimated in the paper.    
Introducing a random term with standard deviation of 0.6 would add a lot of noise to the 
income data – a 70 percent increase in the standard deviation. The simulations show that the 
leakage rate for CA and the non take-up rates based on the second definition for HA and GMI 
will be overestimated. However, adding the random term to the income data will generate 
almost the same non take-up rates based on the first definition for HA and GMI as the ones 
estimated in the paper. The non take-up rates for CA and leakage rates for HA and GMI will 
yet not be achieved by this simulation.  
The non take-up rates for CA would be about the same as in the paper if the random term has 
a standard deviation of 1.2. However, this will also result in 6 times increase in the standard 
deviation of the income data. 
The leakage rates for HA and GMI estimated in the paper cannot be achieved by any 
plausible value of the standard deviation of the random term (as we increase the standard 
deviation, leakage rates for both benefits converge to around 50%, which is about 20-30 
percent lower than the rates estimated in the paper).  
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Table A2: Comparison between non take-up and leakage rates estimated in the paper and from a simulation exercise 
  
Estimates in 
the paper 
(EIP) 
Simulation results after adding a random term to the income data 
SD=0.35 
Proportion 
of EIP SD=0.4 
Proportion 
of EIP SD=0.6 
Proportion 
of EIP SD=1.2 
Proportion 
of EIP SD=1,000,000,000 
Proportion 
of EIP 
HA Non take-up 1 66.4 47.7 0.7 52.3 0.8 65.5 1.0 80.0 1.2 90.8 1.4 
 
Non take-up 2 41.4 40.6 1.0 44.6 1.1 56.6 1.4 71.2 1.7 83.0 2.0 
 
Leakage 64.2 24.8 0.4 26.4 0.4 31.0 0.5 38.1 0.6 50.1 0.8 
GMI Non take-up 1 73.2 45.4 0.6 52.1 0.7 71.6 1.0 90.2 1.2 97.9 1.3 
 
Non take-up 2 46.9 40.9 0.9 47.2 1.0 65.8 1.4 85.8 1.8 95.6 2.0 
 
Leakage 67.6 16.1 0.2 17.7 0.3 23.3 0.3 33.5 0.5 50.0 0.7 
CA Non take-up 1 38.8 19.8 0.5 22.3 0.6 30.9 0.8 46.1 1.2 65.6 1.7 
 
Non take-up 2 33.9 16.5 0.5 18.3 0.5 24.3 0.7 34.7 1.0 48.6 1.4 
  Leakage 19.4 19.5 1.0 21.6 1.1 28.2 1.5 37.5 1.9 50.0 2.6 
Source: Author‟s calculations. Note: The random term is assumed to have a zero mean and to be normally distributed. SD stands for the standard deviation of the random 
term. The cells are highlighted in grey if the non take-up and leakage rates from the simulation exercise are equal or higher than the rates estimated in the paper. The 
simulations are based on 1,000 replications. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of benefit spending over the income distribution 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. Note: The income distribution is based on 
equivalised household incomes before receiving each one of the transfers in turn. The unit of analysis is the 
household. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of benefit recipients over the income distribution 
 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. Note: The income distribution is based on 
equivalised household incomes before receiving each one of the transfers in turn. The unit of analysis is the 
household. 
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Tables 
Table 1: A comparison between EUROMOD, administrative figures and EU-SILC 
 
EUROMOD  (1) 
Admin 
figures (2) 
Ratio 
(1/2) 
EU-SILC  
 (4) 
Ratio 
(4/2) 
A. NUMBER OF SIMULATED BENEFIT ENTITLEMENTS/REPORTED RECIPIENTS (IN 
THOUSANDS) 
HA 208 300 0.69 195 0.65 
GMI 56 77 0.73 46 0.60 
CA 927 835 1.11 808 0.97 
B. TOTAL SPENDING (IN MILLION BGN) 
   
HA 47 83 0.56 39 0.47 
GMI 57 66 0.87 35 0.53 
CA 206 193 1.07 140 0.73 
Source: EUROMOD: Author‟s calculations using EUROMOD. Administrative figures: Boshnakov et al. (2012). 
EU-SILC: EU-SILC 2008 for Bulgaria. 
Note: EUROMOD number of simulated entitlements and EU-SILC number of recipients refer to households 
(GMA and HA) or children (CA). In the administrative figure, the number of GMI recipients equals the monthly-
average number of recipients. The administrative figure for HA shows the total number of paid benefits, while 
for CA it refers to the number of children receiving the benefit. EUROMOD and EU-SILC figures are weighted. 
 
Table 2: Value of benefit entitlement for those entitled to and in receipt of the benefits 
 
HA  GMI  CA  
Mean value of benefit: 
   
Reported 17 63 24 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + 
reporting a positive amount  19 121 33 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + not 
reporting a positive amount  19 72 25 
Sample size: 
   
Reported 364 71 774 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + 
reporting a positive amount  119 23 587 
Simulated for those simulated eligible + not 
reporting a positive amount  238 76 290 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. 
Note: All rates are calculated at the household level. The mean benefit value is in the local currency, BGN. The 
reported benefits are taken from the EU-SILC data while eligibility and size of benefit entitlements (claimed and 
unclaimed) are simulated by EUROMOD.  
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Table 3: Targeting error rates  
Benefit Indicator Rates 
Standard 
error 
95% conf.  interval 
2.5% 97.5% 
HA Non take-up 1 66.4 3.0 60.6 72.2 
 
Non take-up 2 41.4 2.3 37.0 45.9 
 
Leakage 64.2 3.1 58.2 70.2 
 
Exclusion of the poor 77.3 1.5 74.4 80.1 
 
Inclusion of the non-poor 33.9 2.9 28.1 39.6 
GMI Non take-up 1 73.2 5.4 62.6 83.8 
 
Non take-up 2 46.9 4.8 37.4 56.4 
 
Leakage 67.6 6.4 55.2 80.1 
 
Exclusion of the poor 94.0 1.0 92.2 95.9 
 
Inclusion of the non-poor 27.1 5.9 15.6 38.7 
CA Non take-up 1 38.8 1.8 35.2 42.4 
 
Non take-up 2 33.9 1.7 30.6 37.1 
 
Leakage 19.4 1.7 16.0 22.8 
 
Exclusion of the poor 30.0 3.4 23.5 36.6 
 
Inclusion of the non-poor 77.9 1.7 74.5 81.2 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. 
Note: All rates are calculated at the household level. Bootstrap procedure has been used to calculate the standard 
errors and confidence intervals. The bootstrap is based on 1,000 replications of the total household sample. 
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Table 4: Targeting error rates adjusted for benefit underreporting – based on a comparison between EU-SILC and EUROMOD  
  HA  GMI CA  
  
baseline 
estimate 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
baseline 
estimate 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
baseline 
estimate 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
Imputations: non-
recipients 
  entitled  
non-
entitled  
  entitled  
non-
entitled  
  entitled  
non-
entitled  
Non take-up 1 66.4 60.3 66.4 73.2 56.4 73.2 38.8 24.7 38.8 
Non take-up 2 41.4 37.6 39.9 46.9 36.1 42.4 33.9 21.5 30.1 
Leakage 64.2 60.3 66.4 67.6 56.2 73.1 19.4 16.3 32.2 
Imputations: non-
recipients 
  poor  non-poor    poor  non-poor    poor  non-poor  
Exclusion of the poor 77.3 74.9 77.3 94.0 92.4 94.0 30.0 0 30.0 
Inclusion of the non-poor 33.9 31.7 37.9 27.1 22.5 39.4 77.9 71.1 89.1 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. 
Note: All rates are calculated at the household level. 
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Table 5: Targeting error rates adjusted for benefit underreporting – based on a comparison between EU-SILC and administrative figures 
  HA  GMI CA  
  
baseline 
estimate 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
baseline 
estimate 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
baseline 
estimate 
lower 
bound 
upper 
bound 
Imputations: non-
recipients 
  entitled  
non-
entitled  
  entitled  
non-
entitled  
  entitled  
non-
entitled  
Non take-up 1 66.4 16.2 66.4 73.2 20.4 73.2 38.8 35.6 38.8 
Non take-up 2 41.4 10.1 31.5 46.9 13.1 35.0 33.9 31.0 32.9 
Leakage 64.2 41.8 76.7 67.6 41.3 80.3 19.4 18.6 22.8 
Imputations: non-
recipients 
  poor  non-poor    poor  non-poor    poor  non-poor  
Exclusion of the poor 77.3 58.9 77.3 94.0 88.8 94.0 30.0 17.9 30.0 
Inclusion of the non-poor 33.9 22.1 56.9 27.1 16.5 55.7 77.9 75.0 81.0 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. 
Note: All rates are calculated at the household level. 
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Table 6: FGT poverty figures (in %) (change in percentage points (pp)) 
Poverty 
indicator 
Pre-
transfer  
Post-transfer 
Observed 
benefits  
Change  
in pp 
Simulated 
benefits   
Change  
in pp 
Headcount  18.10 17.99 -0.12 17.98 -0.13** 
Gap 6.31 5.74 -0.58*** 4.95 -1.37*** 
Severity 3.34 2.79 -0.55*** 1.90 -1.44*** 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. 
Note: The poverty line is equal to 60% of the median equivalised household disposable income in each scenario. 
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 7:  FGT poverty figures (in %) under different reform scenarios (change in percentage points (pp)) 
Poverty 
indicator 
Pre-
transfer  
Post-transfer 
Income-
test 
Change 
in pp 
Budget-
neutral, 
flat rate 
Change 
in pp 40pl 
Change 
in pp 50pl 
Change 
in pp 60pl 
Change 
in pp 
Headcount  18.10 17.75 -0.35*** 15.25 -2.86*** 18.10 0 18.10 0 14.68 -3.43*** 
Gap 6.31 4.69 -1.62*** 4.69 -1.63*** 5.44 -0.88*** 4.56 -1.75*** 3.18 -3.13*** 
Severity 3.34 1.73 -1.61*** 2.21 -1.13*** 2.28 -1.05*** 1.67 -1.67*** 1.13 -2.20*** 
Source: Author‟s calculations using EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD. 
Note: The poverty line is equal to 60% of the median equivalised household disposable income in each scenario. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
